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Abstract
Spiteful, antisocial behavior undermines the moral and institutional fabric of
society, producing disorder, fear and mistrust. Previous research demonstrates the
willingness of individuals to harm others, but little is understood about how far
people are willing to go in being spiteful or their consistency in spitefulness across
repeated trials. Our experiment is the first to provide individuals with repeated
opportunities to spitefully harm anonymous others when the decision entails zero
cost to the spiter and cannot be observed by the object of spite. This method
reveals that the majority of individuals exhibit consistent (non-)spitefulness over
time and that the distribution of spitefulness is bipolar: when choosing whether to
be spiteful, most individuals either avoid spite altogether or impose the maximum
possible harm on their unwitting victims.
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Introduction
The Stanford Prison Experiment revealed the startling facility with which individuals
lapse into antisocial and sadistic behavior when given the means and opportunity [1, 2].
Given the chance, individuals may readily abandon the peaceable character common to
their daily lives and systematically and brutally mistreat others. Similar destructive
tendencies are evident following breakdowns in traditional mechanisms of social control,
as in the looting and indiscriminate vandalism that often follow in the aftermath of natural
disasters and political demonstrations [3]. Under less extreme conditions, scattered acts
of spitefulness nevertheless occur frequently, from locals pettily misleading tourists to
children bullying their smaller peers.
Explanations for these (mis-)behaviors variously emphasize the importance of situ-
ational factors (e.g. dehumanization, differences in relative power, anonymity, action
unobservability) [1, 2, 4, 5, 6] and individual characteristics such as personal history and
personality [7, 8, 9]. However, evidence from twin studies also suggests that anti-social
behavior has a strong genetic component [10].
When we call an action “spiteful”, we mean that it directly imposes harm on another
and provides no immediate benefit to the spiteful actor. Our notion of spite differs from
that typically employed by evolutionary biologists in that the latter require the spiter
to undertake an (expected) cost when reducing the relative fitness of the other [11, 12].
Costly spite has been observed in some non-human species, e.g. social insects [13] as well
as in humans [14, 15, 16, 17, 18].
However, many empirical studies of spiteful behavior with human subjects suffer from
identification problems. In the case of the classic social-psychology research [1, 2], it is
unclear to what degree spiteful actions are undertaken as a result of implicit or explicit
experimenter demand as opposed to individual desire to do harm. In ultimatum games,
there is debate over the motivations for decisions to reject non-zero offers (see e.g. [19]).
However, since the decision to reject an offer is all or none, even if rejections represent
spite (as claimed in [16]), it is still impossible to measure the extent of spitefulness. In
the public goods games reported in [17], it is unclear whether the observed behavior is
spite or merely an attempt to signal current dissatisfaction with the goal of promoting
future cooperation. Recent experiments on costly ‘antisocial punishment’, in which some
individuals actively punish cooperative others has been observed in a broad range of
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cultures and environments, improve upon these studies because they directly measure the
extent to which individuals are willing to endure costs to impose harm on others [20, 15],
and recent models suggest that such behavior may be a result of selection [21]. However,
in environments where spite is costly, individuals face an unobservable tradeoff between
the costs and benefits of being spiteful. The presence of this tradeoff complicates inference
about spiteful strategies because measured spite will be sensitive to the relative costs of
spite to the spiter and to the target.
One advantage of studying spite in auctions, particularly second price auctions, is that
spite can be measured in the intentional increase of the price that another bidder must
pay. This element was recognized in previous studies of spite in auctions. For example,
[22] report an experiment in which subjects in two-bidder, asymmetric second-price and
ascending bid auctions with complete information on other bidders’ values. They observe
that lower value subjects overbid their values more frequently than higher value subjects.
Similarly, in the auctions reported in [18], overbidding one’s value may be explained by
spite, but in both experiments, subjects submit bids without knowledge of the current
high bid so that these bids still imply some risk of winning the auction. This feature
inhibits measurement of spite as some overbidding may also be explained by judgment
errors and/or a desire to win the item, regardless of cost.1
Evidence from mosquitos indicates that when the costs are borne only by the target,
spiteful behaviors can and will persist [24]. In our experiment, spite is also costless to the
spiter, so that we can directly observe the underlying willingness to do harm.
Although (non-)spitefulness is a prominent behavioral pattern, little is known about
how observed harm compares to the maximum harm that could have been done or to
what degree (non-)spitefulness is stable within individuals over repeated trials. To isolate
these aspects of spite, we report an incentivized laboratory experiment, holding situational
factors constant, in which we can observe spiteful behavior, and we ask: when individuals
have means and opportunity to anonymously harm others at zero personal cost, what is
the prevalence, extent and individual consistency of spitefulness? Is there heterogeneity
of spitefulness across individuals?
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In the next section, we introduce
the experimental design. The following sections report our results and a discussion of their
1See [23] for an earlier paper modeling spiteful preferences in auctions which also potentially explains
overbidding in first-price auctions.
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implications. Then, we provide a detailed description of our experimental procedures, and
an appendix provides a copy of our instructions.
Experimental Design
To generate opportunities to observe spiteful behavior and measure the extent of spiteful-
ness, subjects participate in a sequence of 16 market periods in each of which they attempt
to buy a single unit of a fictitious item. In each of the 16 periods, one unit of supply is
available for purchase in a two-stage auction, and unlimited supply of an identical item is
available at a fixed price after the auction ends. In the first stage of the auction, bidders
are informed about their value and the fixed price at which they can buy after the auction,
and they submit an initial bid for the auctioned item. In the second stage, everyone is
informed about the highest initial bid, and subjects submit their final bids. The item is
allocated to the highest bidder at a price equal to the second highest final bid. Subjects
must submit a final bid, and it must be at least as high as their initial bid, but they are
permitted to resubmit the same bid.2 Those subjects who do not purchase an item at
auction can then purchase it in the aftermarket at the fixed price.
We call a bidder spiteful if she increases the final auction price with no intention of
winning the auction. By submitting a final bid higher than her own initial bid but also
lower than the highest initial bid, a spiteful bidder can increase the price paid by the
winning bidder (thereby reducing that person’s earnings) at no cost to herself. Typically
in auctions, spiteful bidding may be inhibited by bidders’ uncertainty about the current
highest bid. Without this information, making a bid with the goal of driving up the
auction price entails some risk of winning the auction and paying the high price as, e.g.,
on eBay. We eliminate this risk of unintentionally winning the auction by announcing
publicly - just before bidders submit their final bids - the highest bid submitted in the
first stage of the auction. This feature of our experiment not only enables us to observe
spiteful behavior per se but also allows us to quantify the extent of feasible spitefulness:
the maximally spiteful bid is the largest bid that avoids winning the auction.3
We informed subjects only about the highest initial bid and not the second-highest
2These auctions are stylized versions of those employed by the auction website eBay [25, 26].
3One crucial element distinguishing our setup from [22], is that since bidders in their experiments
know others’ values but remain uncertain about their bids until the auction ends. Thus, a spiteful bid in
their environment still entails some risk and does not permit measurement of relative spitefulness.
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initial bid (which would determine the price if the auction ended then), so they could not
differentiate between auction prices that were set by competitive bidding in the initial
stage or by spiteful bidding in the final stage. This prevented subjects from conditioning
their behavior on having been harmed because they could not even know if they were
the object of spite. This design element rules out, e.g., positive and negative reciprocity,
which were argued to drive behavior in [22].
After reviewing the highest initial bid, a subject who is not the high bidder in the first
stage can choose whether to engage in spite (by driving up the price) or not (by keeping
his bid constant), but he may also choose to increase his bid above the highest initial bid
in an attempt to win the auction. To measure the extent of spitefulness, it is essential
that subjects frequently encounter a decision where the latter action is undesirable, or else
we would rarely observe a choice between spiteful and non-spiteful bidding. To increase
the likelihood that a subject may decide whether to be spiteful, we provide each bidder
not winning the auction with the opportunity to buy an item - identical to the auctioned
item - at a fixed price after the auction. Thus if the highest initial bid meets or exceeds
the (expected) fixed price, a bidder should never choose to buy at auction and will instead
wait to buy the identical item later on, but nevertheless, each bidder has to submit a final
bid.
We collected all initial bids before providing subjects with any feedback and before
beginning the second stage of any auction. This removes the possibility that spitefulness
can be justified as a way to teach other subjects that submitting unreasonably high initial
bids can be a costly mistake. We provided feedback on the auction outcome after all
bidders submitted final bids. This provided subjects with many opportunities to observe
how spiteful bids affected the winning bidders’ earnings so that repeated submission of
spiteful bids by the same subject cannot be dismissed by inadvertency.
We designed this experiment as part of a research program on price formation in
auctions, unrelated to spiteful behavior (See [27]). For this reason, our design incorporates
an individual choice “real effort” task between the auction stages and an extra decision,
prior to submitting the final bid, in which subjects may choose whether to recall the fixed
price at which they may purchase in the aftermarket or to earn money in the “real effort”
task.
Each experimental session consists of three stages: an “Opening” stage in which they
submit initial bids in the auction; an “Effort” stage in which they earn money by com-
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pleting a real effort task; and a “Closing” stage in which subjects submit a final bid in
the auction and then subjects who are unable to purchase an item at auction.
In the “Opening” stage, each subject submits a sequence of 16 initial bids, one for
each auction. For each auction, subjects observe their induced value for the item and the
fixed price at which they will later be able to purchase. After receiving this information
for the first auction, they submit their first bid. Then the process repeats until they have
submitted initial bids for all 16 auctions.
Following the initial bids, subjects enter the “Effort” stage. Here each subject par-
ticipates in 3, two-minute periods of a real-effort ’slider task’ [28] with a break of one
minute in between. Subjects observe a screen with 48 sliders, each representing a scale
from 0 to 100. The sliders are initially set to ”0”, and subjects receive a payment k∗ = 5
for each slider that they set to “50” by the end of the two minutes. (We expect subjects
being capable of correctly placing 15-20 sliders in a two-minute period leading payments
of 1.50-3.00 EUR over the three tasks.)
At the end of the Effort stage, subjects enter the third and final stage of the session in
which each auction ends in the same sequence in which the subject submitted bids in the
Opening stage. The “Closing” stage is divided into two sub-stages for each auction, which
we call the “Market” and the “Aftermarket”. In the Market sub-stage, subjects observe
their bid and whether they are currently the highest bidder. Then, they may submit a
new bid if they desire. However, if they want to recall the fixed price before making their
bid, they must agree to forgo the opportunity to participate in another minute of the
slider task. Hence, by varying the value of k in the slider task, we vary the opportunity
cost of recalling the fixed price, and we can observe the effect of opportunity cost on the
probability of overbidding in the auction. We do not discuss the findings related to this
hypothesis here, but see also [27], for a discussion.
After each subject submits a new bid (or resubmits the original bid), those subjects
who did not choose to observe the fixed price participate in one minute of the slider task
in which each correctly placed slider yields a return of kgroup. Those who choose to forgo
the slider task must wait quietly. At the end of the minute, the auction immediately
concludes with the highest bidder paying the second highest bid. Each subject learns
whether they were able to purchase the good at auction, and those subjects who were
unsuccessful are then given the opportunity to purchase in the Aftermarket sub-stage. In
the Aftermarket, the fixed price is revealed to all the remaining buyers at no cost, and
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subjects simply choose whether or not to buy at the revealed price. At the end of the first
aftermarket, the second auction enters the Closing stage, and so on until all the auctions
have closed.
Each auction consists of n = 3 bidders chosen from a matching group of size N = 12.
For each auction, each subject receives a randomly drawn integer value, v ∼ U [500, 1000],
and we draw the fixed price, p ∼ U [300, 500], so that buyers will always buy in the
aftermarket even if they are unable to buy at auction. Thus, we can observe spite in the
absence of concerns about being unable to purchase an item. Over the sequence of 16
auctions, all four groups face the same values and fixed price in each auction. Our design
also varies the value of k in the slider task (though this variation does not matter for the
results we report here). Specifically, in each auction, one group of 3 bidders faces each of
kgroup ∈ {0, 5, 15, 30}. We rematch groups to ensure that each bidder faces each value of
k four times.
Subjects are rematched across auctions and receive no additional information about
the other bidders in their auction. The bidder’s role is framed as that of a seller facing the
opportunity of buying several commodities in the auctions for resale to the experimenters,
one commodity per auction. One advantage of this framing is that it better motivates
participation in multiple auctions. In the instructions, we inform subjects that they will
learn the fixed price in the Opening stage and that they “will have the option to review
the fixed price before submitting a new bid in the Closing stage.” This language avoids
the implication that the opportunity is freely available without directly revealing our
treatment variation. We also inform subjects that “if [they] are unable to buy the item
in the auction, [they] will be able to purchase an identical item during the Aftermarket.”
See the online supplementary information for a complete set of instructions.
Results
We define potentially spiteful bids as all final bids that were not directed at winning the
auction (i.e. were lower than the highest initial bid). Subjects submitted potentially
spiteful bids in 383 out of 768 instances, so we have ample opportunity to identify spite.
We call a final bid spiteful if it is both greater than the bidder’s own initial bid and less
than the highest initial bid so that it necessarily increases the price paid by the auction
winner. We call a final bid maximally spiteful if it is exactly one bidding increment less
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than the highest initial bid (e.g. if the highest initial bid was 100, a maximally spiteful
bid would be 99). Such a bid maximizes the loss a spiteful bidder can impose on the
auction winner without risk of winning the auction. We observe abundant spite as 67.6%
of all potentially spiteful final bids are actually spiteful. Furthermore, 31.1% of potentially
spiteful bids are maximally spiteful. The frequency of observing a spiteful bid is roughly
constant over trials, but the frequency of maximally spiteful bids is increasing (Figure 1).
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Figure 1: Time series of the relative frequencies of spiteful and maximally spite-
ful bids, conditional on bids being potentially spiteful. The solid line indicates
the observed relative frequency of subjects making a spiteful bid in each trial, and the
dashed line indicates the observed relative frequency of a maximally spiteful bid. Capped
spikes display the standard errors of the mean in each trial. The subgraph displays the
number of opportunities to observe a spiteful bid in each trial, and suggests that the
relative frequency of observing spite is not related to the number of opportunities to be
spiteful.
To facilitate inter- and intra-subject comparisons of the extent of spitefulness, we
compute the share of observed harm imposed (price increase) by subject i in trial t out of
the maximum possible harm in that trial. Denote the initial bid and final bid by b1sti,t and
b2ndi,t and the highest initial bid by b
max
t . Spitefulness is defined as the actual bid increase
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divided by the maximum possible bid increase that implies no risk of winning the auction,
Si,t =
b2ndi,t − b1sti,t
(bmaxt − 1)− b1sti,t
conditional on a subject not attempting to win the auction, so that Si,t ∈ [0, 1]. The
distribution of spitefulness indicates that we not only observe spiteful bids with striking
frequency, the distribution of spitefulness is also highly skewed to both tails, indicating
that most bids are either not spiteful at all or maximally spiteful (Figure 2). Note that for
a bidder who has decided not to try to win the auction, any bid less than the first stage
high bid is, strictly speaking, a weak best response. However, if subjects were adopting
such a strategy, we would expect them to choose each value between their current bid
and the current high bid with equal probability. Clearly from the u-shaped distribution
of spitefulness in Figure 2, this is not the case.
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Figure 2: Histogram of measured spitefulness (Si,t), pooled over all subjects and
trials. The height of each bar represents the relative frequency of observing spitefulness
in each of 50 intervals of length 0.02. Nearly 70% of the weight of the distribution is
in the extreme values zero and one, indicating that, given the opportunity, subjects are
either maximally spiteful or not spiteful at all.
Our measure of spitefulness Si,t does not distinguish between a maximally spiteful bid
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that raised the final price by 2 and another that raised the final price by 200, although the
extent of spitefulness may depend on the maximal harm that can be imposed. However,
the data suggest that the decision to be maximally spiteful, as measured by Si,t, is inde-
pendent of the potential harm done (Figure 3). We present the data separately for men
and women to control for a potential gender effect as there is mixed evidence on gender
differences in antisocial behavior [10, 29]. Our data in both panels suggest the absence of
a gender effect.
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Figure 3: The effects of the magnitude of maximum harm possible and gen-
der on spitefulness. The panels present the data separately for males and females.
Each data point represents one observation of spitefulness relative to the magnitude of
maximum harm possible.
Panel regression analysis (n = 383) confirms the absence of both magnitude and gender
effects. We regress spitefulness on the magnitude of potential harm, a gender dummy,
an interaction between female and magnitude of potential harm, the aftermarket price,
and a time (trial) trend along with a constant. The estimates show that spitefulness
is affected by neither the level of possible harm (p-value = 0.187) nor by gender or the
interaction term (p-values = 0.615 and 0.708). We include the aftermarket price because it
may potentially affect spitefulness. For example, when the aftermarket price is high, those
bidders who do not buy in the auction may want to raise the price paid by auction winners
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so that their earnings are not substantially different.4 However, we find that spitefulness
is unaffected by the aftermarket price (p-value = 0.357); full regression output is available
in Table 1. Consistent with the increase in spitefulness over time (Figure 1), the estimated
time trend is positive and highly significant (p-value < 0.01).
Independent Variable Coefficient Rob. Std. Err. z p-value 95% conf. interval
Maximum Possible Harm 0.00015 0.00011 1.32 0.187 [-0.00007, 0.00036]
Aftermarket Price -0.00020 0.00022 0.92 0.357 [-0.00063, 0.00023]
Female -0.05767 0.11480 -0.50 0.615 [-0.28267, 0.16733]
Female·(Max. Harm.) -0.00005 0.00014 -0.37 0.708 [-0.00033, 0.00022]
Trial 0.02105∗∗∗ 0.00652 3.23 0.001 [ 0.00827, 0.03383]
Constant 0.38353∗∗∗ 0.11886 3.23 0.001 [ 0.15058, 0.61649]
Table 1: Random effects estimation of relative spitefulness Si,t. Significance levels
are denoted by: ∗∗∗0.001, ∗∗0.01, ∗0.05. The random effects error structure is included for
individual subjects to control for repeated measurement. A positive and significant coef-
ficient of Trial (t) indicates increasing spitefulness over time. Note also the insignificant
coefficients on Maximum Harm, Aftermarket Price, Female and their interaction.
Finally, we examine the heterogeneity of spitefulness between and within individuals.
While 5 subjects are maximally spiteful at every opportunity (i.e. Si,t = 1 whenever spite
was possible), 6 of them are never spiteful (i.e. Si,t = 0 whenever spite was possible).
Similarly, we find that 13/45 subjects are maximally spiteful at least 50% of the time, and
14/45 subjects are not at all spiteful at least 50% of the time. This is markedly similar
to the observed distribution of spitefulness in Figure 2.
More generally, many subjects display striking consistency in their level of (non-
)spitefulness (Figure 4). To further evaluate individual consistency, we estimate a simple
linear regression, separately for each subject, where the dependent variable is spitefulness
Si,t and the independent variable is trial t. We classify a subject as behaviorally inconsis-
tent if the regression yields a significant estimate of the trial coefficient. By this criterion
73.3% of our subjects display consistent levels of (non-)spitefulness. Note that the individ-
ual stability of spitefulness appears to be inconsistent with the significant aggregate time
trend noted in Figure 1 and Table 1; the reason we observe increasing average spitefulness
over time is that, among the individuals whose level of spitefulness is not consistent over
time, 10 out of 12 show an increasing trend. This creates an increase in the aggregate
level of spitefulness, despite the stability of most individuals.
4[30] observe that in a modified dictator game, when individuals receive low offers, some subjects are
willing to incur a small cost to substantially reduce the payoff of the other.
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Figure 4: Barplot time series of individual spitefulness (Si,t). Each panel displays
the spite data for a single subject. Panels are sorted from top to bottom by average
spitefulness. Each bar represents the measured spitefulness of a subject in the indicated
trial; if the bar has the length of a dot, the subject had the opportunity to act spitefully
but chose to be non-spiteful. Each dashed line shows a linear fit to the data for subjects
classified as behaviorally inconsistent, i.e. if the estimated coefficient of trial (t) is in-
significant at a level of 5%. Out of 48 subjects, 45 had the opportunity to submit spiteful
bids. The data reveal both considerable heterogeneity in spitefulness across individuals
and consistency within individuals.
Discussion
One potential concern with our method of measuring spite is that some bids which we
label spiteful may result from alternative bidding strategies. For example, bidders who
discover that the initial high bid is greater than their value have a weak best response to
bid their value, and if their initial bid is less than their value, this strategy will produce
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a positive measure of spitefulness. Similarly, bidders who know the posted aftermarket
price have a dominant strategy to bid the minimum of their value and the posted price;
here too, for a sufficiently low initial bid, a final bid that follows this strategy will be
measured as spiteful. Figure 5a provides a scatter plot of potentially spiteful bidders’
final bids against their values, and Figure 5b plots potentially spiteful bidders’ final bids
against the aftermarket price. Neither values nor aftermarket prices appear to account
for observed bids.
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Figure 5: Scatterplots of final bids submitted by potentially spiteful bidders.
Panel (a) shows the relationship between potentially spiteful final bids and values, and
panel (b) shows the relationship between such bids and the aftermarket price. Each point
represents a single bid, and the lines provide a reference showing where the bid equals
each value or aftermarket price.
Our experiment places subjects in repeated situations in which they choose whether
to spitefully harm an anonymous other at zero cost and in which spiteful acts are not
revealed as such during or after the interaction. Because we have access to information
not only about how much harm was imposed, but also how much harm could have been
imposed, we are able to directly measure each individual’s level of spitefulness. In this
setup we find that spitefulness widely prevails, but its distribution is bipolar; typically
we observe either zero or maximum spitefulness. The shape of the distribution is neither
accidental nor generated by arbitrary behavior on the part of subjects. Instead the large
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majority of subjects exhibit consistent spitefulness across trials suggesting the existence
of a stable individual characteristic of (non-)spitefulness, conditional on circumstances.
Methods
Ethics Statement
All experiments were conducted with the informed consent of 48 healthy adult subjects
who were free to withdraw from participation at any time. Only individuals who vol-
untarily entered the experiment recruiting database were invited, and informed consent
was indicated by electronic acceptance of an invitation to attend an experimental session.
The experiments were conducted following the peer-approved procedures established by
Maastricht University’s Behavioral and Experimental Economics Laboratory (BEElab).
Our study was approved by the BEElab at a public ethics review and project proposal
meeting that is mandatory for all scholars wishing to use the BEElab facilities.
Experimental Procedures
The experiments were conducted at the BEElab of Maastricht University with 48 stu-
dents. Subjects’ decisions were fully incentivized using Experimental Currency Units
(ECUs). Their ECU-profits were converted to EUR at a rate of 100 ECU = 1 EUR and
these from two randomly selected auctions were paid to them in cash at the end of the
experiment. In order to avoid the influence of wealth effects, at the end of the experiment,
we randomly select two auctions for each subject for payment. Then subjects receive pri-
vate cash payments including a 4 EUR payment for arriving to the experiment on time,
their earnings from the Effort stage, and their earnings from the two randomly selected
auctions (including what they earned in the slider task, if they participated).
In total we ran 4 sessions of 12 subjects drawn from the undergraduate population of
Maastricht University (Average age = 22.6, 46% Female). On average, subjects earned
15.32 EUR for a 60-minute session ranging from a low of 6.93 EUR to 26.65 EUR, including
show-up payment. All sessions were conducted in May 2011.
Our experiment was programmed using the z-Tree software package [31]. Some graph-
ics and data analysis were performed using R, an open-source statistical software [32].
14
References
[1] Haney C, Banks WC, Zimbardo PG (1973) Study of prisoners and guards in a sim-
ulated prison. Nav Res Rev 9: 1-17.
[2] Haney C, Banks WC, Zimbardo PG (1973) Interpersonal dynamics in a simulated
prison. Int J Criminol Penol 1: 69-97.
[3] Tilly C (2003) The Politics of Collective Violence. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
[4] Merton R (1938) Social structure and anomie. Am Sociol Rev 3: 672-682.
[5] Milgram S (1963) Behavioral study of obedience. J Abnormal Soc Psychol 67: 371-
378.
[6] Abbink K, Sadrieh A (2009) The pleasure of being nasty. Econ Lett 105: 306-308.
[7] Robins L (1978) Sturdy childhood predictors of antisocial behavior: replications from
longitudinal studies. Psych Med 8: 611-622.
[8] Patterson G, DeBaryshe B, E R (1989) A developmental perspective on antisocial
behavior. Am Psych 44: 329-335.
[9] Miller JD, Lynham D (2001) Structural models of personality and their relation to
anti-social behavior: a meta-analytic review. Crim 39: 765-798.
[10] Rhee SH, Waldman ID (2002) Genetic and environmental influences on antisocial
behavior: A meta-analysis of twin and adoption studies. Psychol Bull 128: 490-529.
[11] Hamilton WD (1970) Selfish and spiteful behavior in an evolutionary model. Nature
228: 1218-1220.
[12] Knowlton N, A PG (1979) An evolutionarily stable strategy approach to indiscrimi-
nate spite. Nature 279: 419-421.
[13] Foster KR, Wenseleers T (2000) Spite in social insects. Trends Ecol Evol 11: 469-470.
[14] Levine D (1998) Modeling altruism and spitefulness in experiments. Review of eco-
nomic dynamics 1: 593–622.
15
[15] Fehr E, Hoff K, Kshetramade M (2008) Spite and development. Am Econ Rev 98:
494-499.
[16] Pillutla MM, Murnighan JK (1996) Unfairness, anger, and spite: Emotional rejec-
tions of ultimatum offers. Org Behav Hum Dec Proc 68: 208-224.
[17] Cason T, Saijo T, Yamato T (2002) Voluntary participation and spite in public good
provision experiments: an international comparison. Experimental Economics 5:
133–153.
[18] Cooper DJ, Fang H (2008) Understanding overbidding in second price auctions: An
experimental study. Econ J 118: 490-529.
[19] Hoffman E, McCabe K, Shachat K, Smith V (1994) Preferences, property rights, and
anonymity in bargaining games. Games and Economic Behavior 7: 346–380.
[20] Herrmann B, Thoni C, Gaechter S (2008) Antisocial punishment across societies.
Science 319: 1362-1367.
[21] Rand DG, Nowak MA (2011) The evolution of antisocial punishment in optional
public goods games. Nat Commun 2: 1-7.
[22] Nishimura N, Cason TN, Saijo T, Ikeda Y (2011) Spite and reciprocity in auctions.
Games 2: 365–411.
[23] Morgan J, Steiglitz K, Reis G (2003) The spite motive and equilibrium behavior in
auctions. Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy 2: 1102–1127.
[24] Hurst LD (1991) The evolution of cytoplasmic incompatibility or when spite can be
successful. J Theor Biol 148: 269-277.
[25] Ariely D, Ockenfels A, Roth AE (2005) An experimental analysis of ending rules in
internet auctions. RAND J Econ 36: 890-907.
[26] Roth AE, Ockenfels A (2002) Last-minute bidding and the rules for ending second-
price auctions: Evidence from ebay and amazon auctions on the internet. Am Econ
Rev 92: 1093-1103.
[27] Kimbrough EO, Reiss JP Opportunity cost explains overbidding in auctions. Mimeo.
16
[28] Gill D, Prowse V (Forthcoming) A structural analysis of disappointment aversion in
a real effort competition. Am Econ Rev .
[29] Hyde J (1984) How large are gender differences in aggression? a developmental
meta-analysis. Dev Psychol 20: 722-736.
[30] Houser D, Xiao E (2010) Inequality-seeking punishment. Economics Letters 109:
20–23.
[31] Fischbacher U (2007) z-tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments.
Exp Econ 10: 171-178.
[32] Team RDC (2011) R: A Language and Environment for Statistical Computing. Vi-
enna: R Foundation for Statistical Computing.
Supplementary Information: Experiment Instructions
General information
You are now participating in a decision making experiment. If you follow the instructions
carefully, you can earn a considerable amount of money depending on your decisions and
the decisions of the other participants.
This set of instructions is for your private use only. During the experiment you are
not allowed to communicate with anybody. In case of questions, please raise your hand.
Then we will come to your seat and answer your questions. Any violation of this rule ex-
cludes you immediately from the experiment and all payments. The research organisation
METEOR has provided funds for conducting this experiment.
During the experiment the outcome of your decisions will be measured in ECU (Ex-
perimental Currency Units) instead of Euro. We will convert your total earnings into
Euro at a rate of 100 ECU = 1 Euro at the end of the experiment and pay you in cash
privately.
Outline of the Experiment
This experiment consists of 16 auctions of fictitious items, each of which will have some
value to you; you can think of your value as the amount of money (in ECU) that the
experimenter will pay you for the item if you buy it. So, if you have a value of 800 ECU
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for the item, and you buy it in the auction, you will earn 800 minus the price (800 - P)
ECU.
In each auction, your value will be a random number between 500 and 1000 ECU.
Each value is equally likely. You will have a new random value in each auction.
There are three (3) bidders in each auction, and the two (2) other people in each
auction will change randomly. Other people also receive random values between 500 and
1000 ECU for each item, and all values are determined independently of one another. You
will only know your own value, and the other people will only know their own values.
At the end of each auction, the person who submitted the highest bid receives the
item and pays for it a price equal to the second highest bid. If there is a tie for the high
bid, the item is assigned to one of the bidders by chance, and the price paid is equal to
the bid.
If you do not submit the highest bid, so that you do not receive the item in the auction,
you can buy an identical item after the auction at a fixed price between 300 and 500 ECU,
called the aftermarket price.
Anyone who did not buy the item in the auction can buy a unit of the item at the
aftermarket price. This item is identical to the auctioned item so that you have the same
value for it as for the auctioned item.
So, if the aftermarket price is 400 ECU and you choose to buy the item after the
auction, you would receive 800 - 400 = 400 ECU.
Each of the 16 auctions is divided into 3 stages:
(1) Opening Stage each person submits a first bid for the item.
(2) Task Stage each person participates in a task in which they can earn money by
manipulating objects on the computer screen.
(3) Closing Stage each person submits a second and final bid in the auction, and this bid
cannot be smaller than their first bid. Everyone will learn whether they bought item
at auction, and the people who did not buy at auction will have the opportunity to
buy an identical item at the aftermarket price.
The instructions that follow will give you detailed information about stage 1. After
completing stage 1, you will receive detailed instructions for stage 2 and stage 3.
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At the end of the experiment, we will pay you the total of your earnings from the task
in stage 2 plus your earnings from 2 randomly chosen auctions. In addition, you begin
the experiment with an initial endowment of 400 ECU for arriving on time.
Stage 1: The Opening Stage
To begin the experiment, you will participate in the Opening stage for all 16 auctions.
In the Opening stage of each auction, you will see your value for the item and the
aftermarket price at which, after the auction, you will be able to buy an identical item if
you are not the high bidder in the auction.
After reviewing this information, you submit a first bid for the item. Your bid can be
thought of as being the price that you want to pay for the item in the auction.
In the center of the screen, you will see a box in which you can type your first bid.
Once you type in a first bid that you are happy with, you will click the button labelled
“Submit First Bid”.
At the same time, the other people in your auction will submit their own first bids.
Once all bids are submitted for the first auction, the Opening stage will begin for the
second auction.
In the second auction, you will again see your value and the aftermarket price for a
new item, and as before you will submit a first bid.
This process will repeat until you have submitted a first bid for all 16 auctions.
Later, in the 3rd stage of the experiment, you will see the highest first bid in each
of the 16 auctions, and you will have the opportunity to submit a second and final bid
in each auction. Note, your final bid cannot be smaller than your first bid, but you can
submit the same bid again if you wish.
Stage 2: The Slider Task Stage
The Slider Task stage allows you to earn money from a computerised task.
You will now participate in 3 rounds of an identical task lasting 120 seconds per round
with a break of 60 seconds between each round. Rounds 1 and 2 allow you to practice the
task and will not affect your earnings. The score that you will have obtained in round 3
will be used for determining your total earnings from the Slider Task Stage.
The task will consist of a screen with 48 sliders. Each slider is initially positioned at 0
and can be moved as far as 100. Each slider has a number to its right showing its current
position.
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You can use the mouse or the keyboard’s arrow keys in any way you like to move each
slider. To use the arrow keys you have to select the slider that you want to adjust first by
clicking it with the mouse. You can readjust the position of each slider as many times as
you wish. You adjust the sliders to earn points. Specifically, your score in the task will
be the number of sliders positioned at exactly 50 at the end of the 120 seconds.
Your score in round 3 will be converted to ECU at a rate of 1 point = 5 ECU. For
example, if after 120 seconds you have correctly placed 6 sliders at 50, then you have
earned 6 points, which is converted to 30 ECU and will be paid to you at the end of the
experiment.
Thus your Slider Earnings are equal to (Your Score in round 3 x 5 ECU)
Are there any questions?
Stage 3: The Closing Stage
The Closing stage of the 16 auctions consists of two parts, the Market and the Aftermarket.
In the Market part, each person submits a second and final bid for each of the 16 auctions.
Before submitting your final bid, you will be informed of your value, your first bid, and
the highest first bid. After reviewing this information, you will have the option to either:
1) Review the aftermarket price before submitting your bid
OR
2) Participate in another 30-second round of the Slider Task to earn ECUs.
If you choose to review the aftermarket price, you will not be able to participate in the
Slider Task and you will have to wait quietly for 30 seconds. During the 30 seconds
you will be able to see the aftermarket price at which the item will be available in the
Aftermarket part.
On the other hand, if you choose to participate in the Slider Task, you will earn
additional ECU based on your score from correctly adjusting sliders to 50, but you will
not be able to review the aftermarket price before submitting your final bid. The amount
of ECU that you receive per correctly adjusted slider will change over the course of the
16 auctions and you will be informed about it before you choose to participate, or not to
participate - in the task.
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At the end of 30 seconds, everyone will submit a final bid. On the bid submission
screen, everyone will see their value, their first bid, and the highest first bid. After you
review the available information, type in your final bid and click the button labelled
“Submit Final Bid”.
After everyone in your auction submits a final bid, you will be informed of the outcome
of the auction. Remember, the person who submits the highest final bid receives the
auctioned item and pays a price equal to the second highest final bid. Therefore, your
Market Earnings for each auction are computed as follows:
- if you are the high bidder:
– Your Market Earnings = (Your value - 2nd highest final bid) ECU
- if you are not the high bidder:
– Your Market Earnings = 0 ECU
If you are the high bidder so that you receive the auctioned item, then your income in this
round is equal to your Market Earnings and you do not participate in the Aftermarket.
However, if you are not the high bidder, then you will have the opportunity to buy an
identical fictitious item in the Aftermarket as described in the following.
In the Aftermarket, you will be reminded of your value for the item (which is exactly
equal to your value for the auctioned item) and the aftermarket price. If you want to buy
the item at the aftermarket price, then you click the button labelled “Buy”.
Your Aftermarket Earnings are determined as follows:
- if you choose to buy the item in the aftermarket:
– Your Aftermarket Earnings = (your value - the aftermarket price) ECU
- if you choose not to buy the item in the aftermarket:
– Your Aftermarket Earnings = 0 ECU
At the end of the Aftermarket, the Closing stage is over and the auction is complete.
Then we repeat the Closing stage until all 16 auctions are completed.
Your Earnings
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Any auction can end in exactly six ways, and your Auction Earnings for an individual
auction for each of these cases are as follows:
1. You win the item in the auction, and you participate in the Slider Task
Auction Earnings = (your value - 2nd highest final bid + Slider Task Earnings)
ECU
2. You win the item in the auction, and you do not participate in the Slider Task
Auction Earnings = (your value - 2nd highest final bid) ECU
3. You do not win the item at auction, you participate in the Slider Task, and you
choose to buy an item in the Aftermarket.
Auction Earnings = (your value - aftermarket price + Slider Task Earnings) ECU
4. You do not win the item at auction, you do not participate in the Slider Task, and
you choose to buy an item in the Aftermarket.
Auction Earnings = (your value - aftermarket price) ECU
5. You do not win the item at auction, you participate in the Slider Task, and you
choose not to buy an item in the Aftermarket.
Auction Earnings = Slider Task Earnings ECU
6. You do not win the item at auction, you do not participate in the Slider Task, and
you choose not to buy an item in the Aftermarket.
Auction Earnings = 0 ECU
Total Earnings
At the end of the experiment, we will randomly draw 2 out of the 16 auctions for payment
and sum your earnings from the 2 auctions. If your auction earnings are positive, then
your ECU balance increases by this amount. If your auction earnings are negative, you
made a loss and your ECU balance decreases by the amount of the loss. If your auction
earnings are 0 ECU, then your ECU balance does not change.
Finally, we will add your earnings from the Slider Task stage to your ECU balance
and we will convert it to Euro at a rate of 100 ECU = 1 Euro. When the experiment is
over, please wait quietly until we call you for payment.
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